Even 'good' war offers bad choices

By Rajan Menon
THE LOS ANGELES TIMES

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For Barack Obama, Iraq is the bad war and Afghanistan the good war. The president-elect has promised to cut back our involvement in the former and wage the latter with vigor, committing more troops and money. Paradoxically, Obama's solution for Afghanistan could worsen its problems.

The 31,000 American troops in Afghanistan are being supplemented with others from Iraq. If Obama implements the plans he has outlined, the total could double within 18 months. But additional soldiers are unlikely to help create a stable government, curb the drug trade or reduce corruption.

During the first six months of 2008, the number of NATO and U.S. troops in Afghanistan nearly doubled. But as the military presence of the United States and its allies has increased, the Taliban has begun launching larger, more frequent attacks -- particularly in Kandahar, Helmand and Oruzgan provinces. Taliban fighters have taken heavy losses, but they've shown great resilience. And they have moved beyond these southern bastions and are now established in most of the country. Kabul, the capital, has become more dangerous, and the Taliban operates with impunity in the adjacent provinces of Wardak and Logar.

Poppy cultivation has continued to rise. Afghanistan supplies 92 percent of the world's opium, a source of cash for the Taliban. Local governments are more corrupt and less efficient than before the troop surges began.

Obama's advisers know the war is going badly and that simply increasing troop levels won't be enough. They admit the insurgency cannot be crushed militarily and hint at talks with "moderate" Taliban. But they also believe the military situation must first improve; hence, they want more firepower.

Sounds reasonable, but history suggests otherwise. As the British found during the 19th century, and as the Russians learned at the end of the 20th century, military victory in Afghanistan can be elusive. The population is notoriously hostile to outside intervention, and even apparent success often produces a backlash that undoes progress.

Given that adding troops has not produced better results so far, Obama needs to have a plan for what happens if additional troops fail to have much effect and lead the Taliban's die-hards to believe the momentum favors them. Would he then send still more troops?

The U.S. also would like to negotiate with Afghan warriors led by non-Taliban elements, including forces loyal to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, both fundamentalists whom the U.S. and Pakistani intelligence services backed during the anti-Soviet war. Yet none of these groups has been inclined to negotiate.

As for the drug lords and criminal gangs, the war has made them rich. Why end a good thing? American and NATO officials point to gains: the relative peace in once war-ravaged Kabul, rapid economic growth, new construction and rising school enrollments. The question is whether these achievements can be sustained and expanded amid increasing violence. American and NATO officials say they can, another rationale for more troops. But how long can the United States and a few allies carry the burden, especially when other alliance members refuse to provide troops to fight the Taliban despite desperate appeals, and seem less inclined to reconsider as the Taliban grows stronger?

Another downside to adding troops is that NATO's air and ground attacks have repeatedly -- though accidentally -- killed civilians, incensing Afghans, including President Hamid Karzai. Taliban leaders revel in these deaths, which enable them to pose as defenders of faith and nation and to portray Karzai as the occupiers' puppet.